lr is highly controversial whether basic or i nrrinsic preferences and desires may be qualifi ed as "rational" (or "irrational"), or wherher on rhe conuary th is quali.ficarioo does nor make sense. Ri chard B. Brandt -as is well knownrakes side for rationaliry.
1 Of course much depends here on r.he concep1 of rariooaliry one relies on. Let me therefore srarr by quoting Brande's concepcion of ratio nali ty as he stares ir ar. rhe very end of his paper: "I r may be rhar, for a change of scare of mind robe 'rat:ional ', iris enough if ir derives from careful reflection on facrs or juscified beliefs, and is a change whi ch thoughtful people generally would go through as a re,~u l r of such reAecrion." (Seer. 8.8) fr. should be noted that this is a purely procedural definition of racionaliry. Certain ly there are ocher realms of cognition fo r which we are ab le ro formulate a richer concept. Neven:beless I think Brandt's definicion completely adequate in rhe presem comexL By placing "reAecdon" within rhe centre of rariouaJjry ir provides a basis for furrhcr ruscussion without precluding ir. Since T fuUy agree with rhis informal understanding of rarionaliry, ir wiU nor be jn rhe focus of my cri rica l commem. Rather [ wi ll Lry to raise some doubrs abour whethe r the preference changes Brandt refers to are really rht! resulrs of a process of reSection. These preference changes are supposed ro result &om a procedure called "rarional criticism". I will argue in this paper char rhe processes which are supposed ro mke place in rarional cririosm and ro be responsible for evenrual changes of preferences are completely different from processes of reBeccion. If rhis is true rhen ir is to be doubted wherh.er rational criticism as Brandt conceives of it is really able to do its job.
2.
Basically, rational criticism of preferences consists in confronring preferences with "demonsrrared or empirically confirmed beliefs and represeming rhem to [one] self with maximal vividness (possibly involving repetirion)" (~randE's inrroductory remarks). Preferences whid1 do nor survive rhis conf oruation are irrarional whereas preferences which result from ir are called ntcionally cridcized or, for shon, rational.
What kind of processes are possibly induced by such a confrontation? There is a well-known mechanism by which preferences change as a function of a change ofbeliefs. The following is a very clear example of this mechanism:
A srudent prefers studying at University X to studying at University Y, since she believes that Professor B teaches there. On receiving the information that this is false and Professor B actually teaches at University Y her preference is reversed and she now prefers to study at University Y.
Ir is easy to u11dersrand why her preference changes. Her original prefer-' ence was an exrrinsic or derived one. Ir was based on the W~ference ro srudy with ProfessorBand ehe beliefthat Professor B reaches at Uni'ver iL' )' . When this belief proves to be false, the derived preference vanishes, since the more fundamental preference to study with Professor B still stands.
No doubt, preference changes produced bithis kind of mechanism are quite common and will occur on a more or less !arge scale if the preferences of a person are confronted with maximally corrected beliefs. However, if rhis mechanism alone were responsible for the preference changes constitutive of rational criticism we would have to give up the idea that it could ever apply to preferences which arenot derived or intrinsic. Rational criticism would inevitably be limited to extrinsic preferences or, since a preference may be partly intrinsic and partly exrrinsic, to those parts of preferences which are extrinsic. Operatingon the basis of more or less articulate basic preferences, rational criticism could never change those underlying preferences themselves.
3. Clearly, Brandt wants to go fanher than this (see sect. 1 of his paper).
2
Despite the fact that this is, therefore, not the sort of preferencechanging criticism he is after, I should like to make some observations regarding the mechanism at work here.
Firstly, the resulting preferences are predictable as a function of the content of the ~hanged beliefs. This is due to a structurallaw which covers the connection between beliefs and derived preferences, the law being, of course, the principle of expected utility. Secondly, the newly acquired beliefs form, tagether wirh rhe more basic preferences, the sufficienr c::tu e for ehe preference ro change. They do rhe causal worl< alone, no otber causes necd w be prcsenr for rhe change ro occur. Rarher, ir is presuppo ed rhar no other cau al influences inrerferc.
The firsr poinr means rhar rhe process follows arule which secures d-uu rhe change is (to quore Brandr) "genem!Jy rrue of rhougluful people'' (sect. 8.9). The econd poinr emails thar the change of preference is nm rhe arbl rrary byproducr of some menral process bur precisely rhe resulr of a cerrain change f belief. The rwo poinrs cogerher make clear rhac rhe change of pref~.rence is decermined by rhe coruenr of ehe involved mental sraces, whkh is r!1e reason why we may call rhe process in question a process of reßection, 1
Id'l'erefore condude chat for a 1ange of preference co be ehe resulr of a proce s of rcAeccion ic has co be rhe funccion of the conrenr of rhe menral sraces which iniriare ir. oncemin.g ehe process raking place wirhin rational cricicism, considcrations o far have reached rwo resulrs: Firstly, d1ere musr be a mechanism differenr from rhac which pertains co excrinsic preferences in rhe welJ-known way, otherwise intrinsic preferences could never be changed by rational cricicism. 'econdly, rhis mechanism mu r depend on ehe conrem of ehe involved belief:, orherwise rhe wbole proces wouldn'r be a process of reRecrion.
Armcd wirh rhe e insighrs I rurn now ro ome of ehe examples giveo by Brande ro Iook how racional criricism i supposed ro work.
4.
Lee me begin wich three examples oncerning prcferences acquired by misraken generalisacion: rhe poor boy who a quired an aversion ro fur by being rraumarica!Jy frighre.ned when playing wirh a rabbir (secr. 8.4), rhc rieb man who is averse ro spending money because of a descicme childhood (secr. 8.7), and ehe man wbo bebaves aggressively wwards hi employer, whom he somehow idemifies emorionally wirb hi fatber (sact. 8.6). According ro Brandt, in these cases rhe relevanr preference would vani.sh ii confronred wirb a rational belief ro rhe effecr rhar earlier experie.nce were eitber uncypical or would not occur aga.in due ro a changed siruarion.
Burwill rhe boy really lose his aversion ifhe is assured rhar rauehing furs is harmless? WiU ehe rieb man's p>reference nor ro buy Juxurie · really disappeallf be only comes ro realize rhar he will never have ro starve again evcn ifhe spends money on superfl.uous rhing. -a facc by ehe way which will hardly be news ro b.im? Likewise ir eems ar lea r doubrable wherher rhe employee would lose hi aggressive artirude if only he carne co understand rhat his employer was not his father and nor cven in a posirion c mparable ro llis farher' . Now I admit rhat iriseasy ro eure rhesc doubt by iorerprering ehe abovc examples in uch a way chat a d1ange of relevant preferences may wich ccr-tainty be expected. If the boy's strong preference against tauehing furs is acrually based on his beliefthat any such contact will be followed immediately by a frightening event, then of course his aversion will . diminish as soon as he comes to believe that it is very im probable that a frightening event will follow.
So mething parallel holds for the rich man: if his preference agairrst buying superfluous things does actually rest on the beliefthat afterwards he will be badly in want of money-then, of course, his preference will immediately change if he loses this belie( Although it is very natural to understand the examples in rhe way just described, thls interpretation is not helpful in the'present context. They are meant as examples for a change of basic or i111trihsic preferences whereas here rhey are clear cases of extrinsic preferences the rhodification of which is due to the well-known mechanism explained above.
5.
Bur how are we to understand the examples if the involved preferences are inrrinsic ones? The relevant preferences don't actually have to be based on beliefs about the consequences of the preferred propositions. Such beliefs may weil have played a crucial role in the genesis of those preferences, but in the course of time the preferences have gained a standing of their own. Take the example of the now rich man. He has acquired his preferenceagairrst purchasing superfluous things as a consequence ofthebelief that he will have to starve later. But by now this preference has become a trait of his quite iodependem of his beliefs ab out his financial situation.
Given that we understand the relevant preferences in this way, it becomes agam rather questionable whether they will change if there is a change of beliefs. Should a change of preferences occur, on the other hand, that would raise the strong suspicion thar rhey had been derived ones, resring on beliefs about consequences although perhaps those beliefs were up to then quite inarticulate.
If we were not sure whether the boy's aversion to furs was intrinsic or extnnsic, we would certainly take it as a strong evidence for the first case if his aversion remained, even after he becomes convinced that furs are normally not followed by frightening evenrs. If on the other hand his aversion did not survive this information, this would seem to be evidence that it was dependent on a more fundameoral aversion to frightening evenrs.
Prima facie there seem to be only two, mutually exclusive, cases, the one being that the relevant preferences are derived and change due ro newly acquired beliefs; rhe other being rhar the relevant preferences are inrrinsic and do not change if confronted wirh rationalized beliefs.
What Brandt rries to establish is a third case in between: that of prefer-ences which are not derived, but do nevertheless change if confronted with relevant beliefs. In this he can only be successful if he manages to cope with two problems: Firsdy, there must be a definiton of intrinsic preferences which does not imply that they resist any changes ofbelief Secondly it has to be explained what kinds of mechanisms are responsible for a change of imrinsic preferences as a conseq uence of changed beliefs. The first problern seems to be dealt with in section 1 of Brandt's paper. Although I do not fully agree with Brandton this poirit I will gram it. 3 Concerning the second point his idea isthat most intrinsic preferpnces are acquired by conditioning processes-. Therefore he thinks the theory of classical conditioning the appropriate framework to make a case for fUü_dification of imrinsic preferences (sect. 6).
6. The mechanisms which he sees at work here are mainly conditioning, counterconditioning and extinction by inhibition (sects. 8.4 f; Brandt 1979, eh. 5). It is not easy to get a clear picture of how these mechanisms do the causal work they are supposed to do. However Brandt's example in section 9.5 seems ro be a good starting point to Iook for more details.
A man has fallen in Iove. His Iove is unreturned yet he yearns for the affection of the beloved. This is a strong preference for a state of affairs (namely tobe loved by a certain person) and, Iet us assume, it is an intrinsic preference. Now our Iover, Brandt rhinks, would lose his preference if he underwem the following treatment: whenever he is thinking of the beloved, his "reflection might be inrerrupted by a severe shock ro the arm" (sect. 8. 5). After a few such shocks he would have given up his yearning. That does not sound implausible; however, as Brandt hirnself observes, the change of preference would not be the result of rational criticism. Why not? Presumably because it would be the product of plain and simple counterconditioning, a process lacking the cognitive element.
Nevertheless rational criticism is supposed to function in basically the same way, rhe difference being only that it uses "cognitive shocks", i.e. the role of the electric shocks is assumed by beliefs: whenever the Iover is musing favourably on the beloved, he has to think about displeasing attributes or 3 Brandr himsdfdoe:; nmwork with thedi.~rincrion berween inrrimicand exrrinsic prde rcnces bur with thm berween preferc:nces for plnns of acrion and prefcrences ex posr and ex anre for ; cvcnts. As aheady star~d ih rhe previous lootnore, I rhink the former disüncrion is rhe one sysrematically required herc. [ncrimic: prefertnc~. re best defined ~s prefer.:nccs which are not cxtrinsic, where txtrinsic means derivecl accmdlng to thc principle c1f cxpecrecl uri llty.
Thm allows for inr.rinsic preferences dependjng on bdiefs, as long as it is not in rhe wellkoown way whidl woulJ render rhem auillSic. Sec Kusser (1989) , parr 3, 111, 7.
Raüonal by Shock: A Reply to Brandr 83 events involving her. This would give him the purely mental or if you like "cognitive" shock rhat the beloved has negative attribures. Agairr after some efforr his preferences are supposed to be gone. And if rhe rhoughts involved here are true or rationally confirmed rhe whole process will constitute a piece of rational criticism.
7.
Bur would such a change of preference really be due to a process of "reflection" and could we consequent!y qualifY its results as "rational"? The answer is no. Having a certain belief can as such not subseitute for rhe experience of an elecujc shock, since rhe role of the electric shock can only be taken bt sorne other unpleasurable experience. Therefore the causal work is noc clone by the belief rhar rbe beloved has unpleasurable attributes, but by the fact that having such a thought constitutes an unpleasurable experience for the thinker.
A concomitant emotional experience of having a belief, not the belief itself identified by its content, is responsible for the modification of a preference. Admittedly, there seems ro be a certain connection berween these rwo, consisting in the hypothesis that ro have a belief about somerhing unpleasurable (or pleasurable) is irself an unpleasurable (or pleasurable) experience. Bur this tie is weak and arbitrary because we oft:en have beliefs about unpleasurable or pleasurable thingswirbout having an emotional experience consonant wirh rhose beliefs. 4 Moreover, according to rhe rheory of classical condirioning tbere are ;u least rwo other rucial variables which determine rhe ourcome of condüioning pro es es, namely temporal conriguiry and frequency of condicioned scimuli Referring ro our example, rhe pure facr, realized by rhe Iover, t:hat rhe beloved ha unpleasam amibures does not have as uch a causal impact on his preferences. To ruin bis yearning it needs repeated, exclusive and emotionally heavily coloured insisrence on rhe bad arrribures short!y afrer favourably rhinhlng of ehe beloved.
Again, as in the case of the electric shock, I do not doubt that such a strategy could sooner or later eure our Iover. And it is also clear that the mechanism at work here is a proper mechanism as described by the rheory of classical conditioning.
Only it seems to be the wrong mechanism for the intended purposes, i.e. for rendering intrinsic preferences rational. The main variables, reflecting the causes at work here, are the emotional valence of a belief, its mode of representation, its frequency of occurrence and how it is placed wirhin rhe flux ofinner 84 Anna Kusser life. Even if we allow only demonstrated or empirically confirmed beliefs to affect preferences by means of those mechanisms it is never by virrue of their content that they unfold efficacy. Preference changes which follow the theory of classical conditioning are determined by features which arenot systematically tied to the content ofbeliefs. It is therefore misleading to Iabel preference changes which are caused in this way as consequences of "reflection on facts".
8.
The question is now whether the upsbot of the previous considerations can be generalized, i.e. whether it bears on the other examples given by Brande. I must confess that I do not always have a comparably clear picture about why preference changes should occur in the other cases, especially in the first rhree cases. (Neverrh&ess the result of my argument bears fully on them as long as it is supposed that the theory of classical conditioning is the proper framework to describe them. This seems to be the case.
I conclude therefore that Brandt's theory of change of intrinsic preferences as a consequence of confrontation with beliefs is not an adequate background for a concept of rational criticism of preferences. Even if, as Brandt claims, such preference changes did occur in the exarrtples cited by him, that would never allow us to call the former preferences i~rational.
Does that mean that the cases discussed by Brandt are all cases of rational or at least not irrational preferences? No, it only means that Brandt's concept of rational criticism does not provide us with means to do them justice. In fact I think that Brandt really presents an impressive series of "cases in which desires manifestly are mistaken" (secr. 8).
In the remaining part of the paper I will speculate on the sources from which the plausibility of Brandt's concept of rational preferences springs. They are not identical with the sources Brandt manifesdy draws on. Therefore I shall in some degree depart from the grounds Brande provides us with.
But as a starring point Iet me once again rely on one of his examples. It is about a woman who is unable to enjoy herself on Sundays, say by boaring (secr. 8.9). She has acquired this aversion because she has been taught tobelieve rhat there is a loving god who wants Sundays to be kept holy. There are rwo ways ro understand rhis situation: eieher (i) the woman acquired her preference as a consequence of this belief, but by now the preference Stands on its own and is thus intrinsic or (ii) the preference is at present based on this belief and is extrinsic.
In the second case it is quite clear that the preferencewill change as soon as the belief is dropped. Dropping it emails that the wo man no Ionger has ro expect unpreferred consequences-say displeasing the loving god -by sailing Rational by Shock: A Reply w Brandt 85 on Sundays. This is of course a clear case of change of a derived preference as described above. I think it is not necessary togofurther into detail, Iet me simply remark that here pure dropping of the belief at once alters rhe preference.
In the first case, on the other hand, where the preference does not actually depend on the belief, the dropping of the belief as such will not affect the preference. Bur there is anorher aspect to which Brandt draws our attention, namely that the preference in question is one "preventing happiness and general desire-satisfaction" (sect. 8.9). Our Iady would be better offwirhaut this preference since it prevents her from enjoying her free time. Obviously the suggestion is that if she only realized that, her aversion would disappear. This would mean that the preference is irrational in so far as ir cannot confront the facts. Thinking along these lines is very obvious and seems to be the source from which the plausibility of Brandt's concept of rational criticism springs. In all of his examples rhe impression is conveyed that the preference in question is a serious obstacle to rhe person's happiness.
Take again the example of rhe man in Iove: Ir is of course not at all plainly misraken to yearn for someone's affecrion. Ir is only the extra information that rhe affection is not reciprocared which allows us to understand that the desire is in a way mistaken, because we thereby learn rhat the yearning will only be a source of painful Frustration and never the source of happiness. Or take the example of the man who feels bad buying luxuries. What is the problem? He prefers to leave luxuries alone thereby avoiding the unpleasant situation of spending his money on such rhings. But here again rhere seems to be an extra idea, namely that his aversion prevents him from shopping with pleasure and enjoying his purchases afterw:uds. Again, having other preferences would give him a better chance to be happy.
So my first thesis is that the common feature of all the plainly mistaken preferences cited by Brandr is rheir being obstacles to happiness and thar this feature is responsible for our intuition that rhey are faulty. Such preferences I will call "unhappy preferences".
My second rhesis concerns the suggestion rhat rhese preferences, even ifintrinsic, would change if confronted with all available facts. The idea seems to be that if a person fully re;tlizes rhat an intrinsic preference prevents her or him from being happy the preferencewill vanish. This does not hold in my opinion. The presumed change is consuued in analogy to rhe well-known change of extrinsic preferences. The case of the puritanicallady is thus construed as follows: She wants tobe happy (even on Sundays). Iris a consequence of her aversion that she cannot enjoy herself by boaring on Sundays. If she realized rhat, her aversion would decline.
Let me compare this account wich the alternative account where the lady's preference itself is assumed tobe exrrinsic. Look at the belief involved in each case: In the case of the preference being exrrinsic the belief concerns the consequences of sailing on Sundays -namely displeasing rhe loving god. In the case of the preference beingunhappy and intrinsic rhe belief concerns rhe consequences of the aversion to enjoying oneselfby boaring on Sundays-namely not being able to be happy on Sundays.
The difference is this: In rhe first case rhe relevant belief concerns the consequences of something preferred; in rhe second case the belief concerns the consequences of a person's preferring something. The second case deals wich a consequence of a psychological state of the person -namely her or his aversion. And since the consequence of rhis psychological srare-namely not being able ro enjoy oneself on Sundays-is preferred negatively, rhe state irself also gets preferred negatively. This is a preference about a preference, rhat is a second-order-preference. It is generared by a first-order-preference-the preference to be happy even on Sundays -and the belief rhat a certain preference is unhappy. This belief is meant to imply that rhere is some other preference concerning activiries on Sundays which would give rhe wo man a better chance of being happy than rhe preference she happens ro have.
Ir is a further and in my eyes highly questionable step to assume rhar rhe second-order-preference has an immediate impact in that it reshapes ehe unhappy preference accordingly. Only if this assumption held would it be true that rhe beliefthat a preference is unhappy alters the preference in question by generaring a second-order-preference which in turn changes the original unhappy first-order-preference.
In the second part of this paper I have dealt wich the sources from which ehe plausibiliry of Brand c's theory originates. lt was already clear from the first part rhat the plausibil iry of Brandt's concept of rational criticism lies not chiefly in his theory of change of inrrinsic preferences. Rather it is ried to rhe series of plainly mistaken preferences he presents. The persuasive power of rhose examples seems ro be constituted by (i) their common feature of being unhappy preferences and (ii) rhe suggestion that they would change if confronted wirh chis facr.
The first poinr is right and needs some further clarification. The main question is, what positive concept of rationality is involved, if preferences which are obstacles to someone's happiness are accepted as misraken? This is a call for a more precise definirion of a preference being unhappy or happy.
